Madoff Red Flags: How Many Can You Count?

 

With losses estimated at $50 billion, “l’affaire Madoff” is deemed the largest financial fraud in world history. Not since Charles Ponzi scammed millions from investors in the 1920’s have world financial markets seen such a systemic breakdown of what should have and could have been done to prevent fraud. Institutions and individuals alike bear the pain, forcing some organizations to shut their doors, declare bankruptcy, withdraw charitable donations, offer fewer scholarships or go back to work, long after retiring. Litigators and regulators are busy filing lawsuits and enforcement actions that could take years to settle. Questions abound. Who was responsible for due diligence? What could have been done before the fact to preempt financial ruin? What can be done now to avoid subsequent losses?

Based on research of publicly available information, I count well over a dozen red flags, including but not limited to the following:

  • Regularity of returns despite market volatility
  • Complex strategy
  • Poor transparency about performance reporting standards
  • Unknown audit firm
  • Seemingly limited due diligence by some parties
  • Unclear assigment of investigation-related duties (knowing who does what)
  • Questionable diversification
  • Few questions asked about risks
  • Limited internal controls, if any
  • Lure of "movie star" reputation
  • Limited attention paid to hedging efficacy
  • Limited knowledge of rebalancing techniques
  • Limited knowledge of trading limits and stop loss points
  • Limited knowledge of collateral risk
  • Unclear understanding as to who played the role of fiduciary
  • Limited knowledge about asset valuations and related valuation process.

It goes without saying that much remains to be learned about the Madoff situation. The good news is that more attention, at least for some organizations, will now be paid to due diligence and prudent process.

What did I leave off the list that should be added? Email me and let me know.

Funds of Funds - What Comes Next?

According to John Gapper, funds of funds ("FOFs") are significant players, accounting for nearly one-half of all hedge fund assets. This Financial Times chief business commentator connects growing institutional interest to a rise in demand for intermediaries who offer due diligence services. Post-Madoff, he paints a grim picture for the industry unless good players are able to differentiate themselves from those who are now being scrutinized.

Whether certain organizations could have detected fraud is unknown at this time though Grabber suggests that "funds of funds need to work harder and show that they actually contribute something valuable." I am quoted as saying “It is not as if this stuff is really complicated. A lot of the risk of fraud can be mitigated by measures that are low-cost and not very time-intensive.”

I certainly agree with Gapper that there is a "role for the good funds of funds." I'd go further to say that it is unfortunate indeed for those funds of funds that exercised care and discipline in researching  financial and operational risks on behalf of pensions, foundations and endowments. They are unfairly being painted with a dirty brush.

For institutional investors, a key question remain. Will pensions, endowments and foundations continue to reach out to funds of funds or decide instead to hire in-house experts? If they have already hired one of the funds of funds that turns out to be tied to large Madoff-related losses, to what extent might investment fiduciaries be asked to explain their FOF choice and subsequent oversight of said FOF? These are important questions, yet to be answered.

Click to read "Funds of funds have to work harder," Financial Times, January 7, 2009. (Access may be limited to subscribers only.)

Editor's Note: Click to read "Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds and Funds of Hedge Funds," published by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Click to read "Report on Funds of Hedge Funds," published by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, June 2008.

Congress and Hedge Fund Regulation

Many financial market participants seem resigned to an onslaught of new regulations. For them, it is no longer a question of "if" but "when," with the unknown being the form of eventual rule-making. One area that is likely to receive more than a passing glance is the role of the service provider to pensions, endowments and foundations. Always important, the Madoff scandal has pushed the issue front and center as institutional investors, reeling from reported losses, ask their advisors for clarity about their exposure to the now defunct Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. According to "Crackdown on hedge funds after Madoff affair" (December 29, 2008), Financial Times reporters Deborah Brewster and Joanna Chung suggest that funds of funds may be especially feeling the pinch, with an anticipated change in how due diligence is conducted.

Next week's Congressional hearing should be telling. Convened by U.S. Congressman Paul Kanjorski (Democrat - Pennsylvania), this investigative meeting may be "standing room only" as members of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises seek to understand what went awry before being able to "craft a strong, effective, modern regulatory system for the financial services industry." 

Though best left to legal experts, one wonders if a likely inquiry will center on the allocation of fiduciary duties across investors and advisors. Under what circumstances might an advisor or consultant be seen as encouraging an "unsuitable" investment? This of course begs the question as to what is deemed "appropriate" for a particular buyer and on what basis should an investment be assessed for a particular pension, endowment or foundation? We've heard that some financial professionals are responding to l'affaire Madoff by imposing more stringent, and arguably prudent, literacy requirements BEFORE accepting client money.