Are Fiduciaries Paying Enough Attention to Default Risk?

According to Wall Street Journal  reporters Kate Kelly, Liam Pleven and James R. Hagerty, at least ten funds struggle with sub-prime loan woes in the form of diminished portfolio values. As if that isn't bad enough, some institutional investors are being given the unhappy news that withdrawals are suspended. For pension funds in search of liquidity, look elsewhere. (See "Wall Street, Bear Stearns Hit Again By Investors Fleeing Mortgage Sector," Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2007.)

As the fallout continues, with no end in sight, it is worth repeating that fiduciaries are on the hook for creating, and then following, a prudent process with respect to investment selection. ERISA itself mandates that employee benefit plan fiduciaries must carry out their duties in the sole interest of the plan's participants and with the "care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims."

These few words speak volumes about the many things a plan sponsor must consider before committing money to a particular instrument, strategy or asset manager. Questions naturally arise. A few of them are shown below.

1. Have plan sponsors sufficiently queried asset managers about how they measure default risk ?

2. How are structured financial transactions collateralized?

3. Who is responsible for collateral management?

4. What safeguards exist to enforce collateral quality and amount?

5. Do asset managers make their policies and procedures available to plan sponsors who want to know more about valuation, operational controls, collateral issues and trading limits?

6. Are positions being marked to model?

7. Who reviews the integrity of the model and related data inputs?

8. What could cause estimated default risk to rise for "questionable" borrowers and how are asset managers tracking identified risk drivers?

9. What are the investors' rights to withdraw funds?

10. Does an asset manager reserve any capital against its expected risk exposure, voluntarily or otherwise?

Several observations are in order. First, investment problems are not unique to small funds. To the contrary, some large mortgage-related funds (in terms of assets) are currently in crisis mode. Second, recent market drops and rising credit spreads are forcing companies to delay IPOs or incur higher costs of capital. This means that all investors are invariably impacted. Third, the fallout is global, with several prominent non-U.S. funds announcing big hits.

This may be the beginning of the end for easy credit and the start of a "brave new world" for plan sponsors who cannot afford a "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" approach.

Valuation Awakening - Does the Emperor Have Clothes?

A mystery is unfolding. How can securities receive robust credit ratings and then turn out to have questionable value? Isn't there supposed to be continued oversight vis-a-vis an issuer's ability to pay? In "Moody's CFO sued over bond ratings; Firm gave too high ratings to sub-prime bonds," Business Times Singapore reports on a class action complaint by a private investor. Alleging that the CFO "failed to disclose that Moody's assigned 'excessively' high ratings to bonds that were backed by sub-prime mortgages," traders are now betting that additional suits against other rating agencies will follow. While a complaint in no way attaches guilt to the defendant, it will be interesting to learn more about the sub-prime bond ratings process if these cases proceed. (Some organizations post information on the website.)

Reuters reporter Neil Shah discusses some pitfalls when complex securities are "marked to model," including unrealistic assumptions that can skew results. "The worry is that well-heeled hedge funds, Wall Street proprietary trading desks and ratings agencies may be too optimistic when analyzing or valuing exotic mortgage investments. As a consequence, future drops in market prices may be more severe and possibly trigger panic selling by sophisticated investors." (Click here to read "Can Wall Street be trusted to value risky CDOs?" July 16, 2007)

As investors wait for the other shoe to drop, readers are reminded that process is everything. Unless a plan sponsor is prepared to ask tough questions about how an asset manager values the portfolio and components thereof, it may be a redux of "The Emperor Has No Clothes." Worse yet, individual fiduciaries could be exposed to allegations of breach for failure to effect proper due diligence." As an Accredited Valuation Analyst, my appraiser colleagues would no doubt concur with me. Valuation is a specialty and not to be taken lightly. As markets tank ("worst fall in nearly five months" on July 24) plan sponsors may find themselves in an uncomfortable double whammy position - plunging prices of traded equities and difficulty in unwinding "hard to value" instruments. (See "Markets tumble as credit concerns spread" by Michael Mackenzie and Saskia Scholtes, Financial Times, July 24, 2007)

Though written in 2004, "Asset Valuation: Not a Trivial Pursuit" by Dr. Susan M. Mangiero is still worth a read. Click here to download the article. (You can sign up for a free 14-day trial subscription and access the article for no charge.) Drop us an email if you want to know more about our training in the areas of risk and valuation for trustees, board members and investment committees. All inquiries will be kept private.