Hegemony in Alternatives Land - Are Pensions Getting the Upper Hand?

According to "Investors warn private equity over cash calls" (March 26, 2009), Reuters reporter Simon Meads writes that private equity firms are facing "intense pressure" from limited partners (pensions, endowments and foundations). Cash strapped themselves, institutional investors are telling asset managers not to come knocking on cash infusion doors any time soon.

Does this phenomenon present a fiduciary conundrum? For one thing, might a limited partner be sued for a contractual breach if they refuse to pony up additional monies? Second, could a dearth of new cash making its way to private equity fund managers end up creating more financial pain for the limited partners? After all, if a private equity and/or venture capital fund finds itself short of the almighty dollar (or other currency), it may be unable to invest in new companies deemed to be high growth and/or be hamstrung from keeping current portfolio companies afloat. On the other hand, limited partners may be reeling from their own pain (whether Madoff induced, stemming from equity losses or something else) and figure that the cost of incremental disbursements outweighs the expense of abstaining.

One thing seems clear.

Institutional investors are demanding more for less. In "Calpers Tells Hedge Funds to Fix Terms -- or Else" (March 28, 2009), Wall Street Journal reporters Jenny Strasburg and Craig Karmin write that this large California giant is "demanding better terms from hedge funds, including lower prices and 'clawbacks' of fees if performance weakens." Said to have been sent to 26 hedge and 9 funds of funds, a March 11, 2009 memo outlines terms, with a proviso that counter terms will be considered.

In a March 6, 2009 article by the same two writers, the deputy chief investment officer for the Utah Retirement System echoes similar sentiments. In his "Summary of Preferred Hedge Fund Terms," Larry Powell calls for lower fees, adding that "management fees should be used to cover operating expenses only, and are not appropriate funding sources for staff bonuses, business reinvestment, strategy expansion, or wealth accumulation by partners." The 4-page letter urges a share structure that transfers "liquidity risk evenly among commingled investors" that could result in how gates, lock-ups and redemption terms apply to short and long-term investors, respectively. Regarding disclosures, Powell describes a minimum laundry list to include items such as:

  • Annual audited financial statements
  • Quarterly information about fees, operational costs, concentration of clients and soft dollar activity
  • Monthly Net Asset Values, return attribution by strategy, geography and/or sector, largest long/short positions, leverage at the fund and strategy level
  • Weekly return attributions and month-to-date estimates of return.

We've heard numerous institutional investors put a stake in the ground for what they perceive to be a more level playing field (their words). Just a few months ago, I led a workshop on risk management and "hard to value" investing red flags to a group of large public plan auditors. Many of the audience members described a "disclose" or "we'll walk" policy now in force with respect to alternative funds. (Hopefully it goes without saying that not every alternative fund is a "hard to value" fund.)

Several things come to mind. Could demands from institutional investors be potent enough, if met, to stave off new regulatory mandates, some of which are outlined in "Does More Financial Regulation Make Us Safer?" (March 29, 2009)? Second, might we see a flurry of alternative fund manager fee-related lawsuits, similar to 401(k) "excessive" allegations that are making their way through the court system?

The match is on - investor versus manager. Who will get the biggest slice of the pie going forward with respect to economic rights?

CalPERS Invests in Infrastructure

According to blogger extraordinaire and Sacramento Bee reporter Jon Ortiz , the California giant will now invest in "PPP" (public private partnership) deals but with strings attached. According to their policy entitled "Infrastructure Program," posted on "The State Worker" and elsewhere, projects to build bridges, roads and other types of infrastructure should avoid displacement of California municipal workers "provided that CalPERS' fiduciary responsibilities are met." Subsequent text adds that "the investment vehicle shall make every good faith effort to ensure that such transactions have no more than a de minimus adverse impact on existing jobs."

Far be it from me to impugn any group of workers, municipal or private. However, one does wonder if CalPERS and infrastructure fund managers will soon find themselves at loggerheads. If I read the policy correctly, it seems to put an awful lot of responsibility on external portfolio managers to address wage differentials (if any exist) for the express purpose of assessing the cost-effectiveness of labor resources. Employment economics is a speciality in its own right. Should infrastructure moneymen (and women) hire outside experts to undertake a comprehensive study to determine whether private versus public workers are best suited for a particular project? How might such fees, paid to labor economists by money managers but passed along to institutional investors such as CalPERS, erode reported returns? Could returns be eroded by so much that the benefits of investing in infrastructure in the first place are more than offset by CalPERS' mandate to avoid loss of state jobs?

According to Brian K. Miller ("CalPERS Changing PPP Language," GlobeSt.com, August 15, 2008), the California Public Employees Retirement System ("CalPERS") altered its policy so as not to be sued by the Professional Engineers in California Government ("PECG"). The American Council of Engineering Companies of California (the private equivalent of the PECG) countered that threat of litigation does no one any good.

Does this type of allegedly veiled political "intervention" sound familiar?

Just a few days ago, Massachusetts State Treasurer Tim Cahill said "no thanks" to Governor Deval Patrick, when asked to allocate pension assets to bonds issued by the state's student loan organization. In "Cahill rejects student-loan proposal" by Casey Ross (The Boston Globe, August 8, 2008), fiduciary concerns are front and center. In "Massachusetts Pension Plan Urged to Invest in School Loans" (August 8, 2008 blog post), I wrote as follows:

Here's the rub. The state pension trustees have a fiduciary duty to make sure that the plan is in good financial shape. Will statutory investing put those fiduciaries at risk for allegations of breach in the event that MEFA bonds sour or perhaps offer a sub-optimal return?

I think the same principle applies to the CalPERS decision, sending mixed signals about competing constituencies - state engineers versus plan participants. Complicating things, could state workers win now by keeping their jobs (for certain infrastructure projects) but lose later on if infrastructure investments fare poorly due to labor-related cost issues and so on?

What a dilemma!

Leverage: Friend or Foe to Pension Investors?



In today's New York Times, reporter Jenny Anderson talks about lackluster returns for some hedge funds. In "Hedging '06: Year to Read the Caveats," she quotes Christy Wood, CALPERS senior investment officer, as saying that this year marks the third year that "the global equity markets and long-only managers outperformed hedge funds" and that "If you threw all these in an index fund net of fees, you would have done better than if you put it in the hedge fund industry."

The article continues that CALPERS has another $3.5 billion to invest, beyond the existing $4 billion in hedge fund investments. Their appeal, says Ms. Wood, is equitylike performance with bondlike risk.

The numbers are compelling. Courtesy of data from Hedge Fund Research, the article describes inflows in excess of $110 billion through Q3-2006, compared with $47 billion last year.

What caught my eye is the quote about leverage and the notion that markets have all but ignored situations like Amaranth and its reported $6 billion loss.

Excerpted from this piece, investment advisor Stewart R. Massey, founding partner of Massey, Quick & Company, is quoted as saying that "If there's a lesson in 2006 - and no one talks about it anymore - it's that leverage is a very dangerous thing" and "there's too much out there."

On the face of it, leverage is not necessarily bad (nor is it necessarily good). However, in bad times, levered investments can cause significant harm to a pension fund portfolio. Let's hope that fiduciaries are asking good questions about leverage and not forgetting that things can sour quickly. Far from an exhaustive list, here are a few basic queries for hedge fund managers.

1. How does your fund measure leverage?

2. What is the fund's average leverage measurement?

3. Are there particular market conditions and/or investment positions that worsen leverage?

4. What is the fund's stop-loss policy as a way to curtail trouble before it's too late?

5. How does the fund value its "hard-to-value" positions and what is the likely impact on reported leverage?

6. Does the fund's leverage vary over time or has it been relatively stable?

7. How does the fund's leverage metric compare with similar strategy hedge funds?

8. How does the fund' return compare with similarly leveraged peers?

9. Does the fund's risk management policy address leverage?

10. Does the fund plan to do anything different going forward that would materially impact leverage? If so, why and what policy changes will occur as a result?