Pension Risk News & Analysis : Pension Governance, LLC : Pension Risk & Investment

Governor Arnold Schwarnegger has put the kabosh on a state legislative attempt to prohibit the state's two largest public pension funds from allocating to certain money managers. Arguing that AB 1967 puts undue strain on the California Public Employees' Retirement System and the Calfornia State Teachers' Retirement System by prohibiting money managers who invest in countries with human-rights issues. If adopted, The Carlyle Group (owned in part by the United Arab Emirates) would be off limits and thereby shut off private equity deal flow. In his April 9, 2008 op-ed piece, published by the Los Angeles Times, Governor Schwarnegger writes that measure AB 1967 would "cause a deep wound to our retirement funds and government programs when we can least afford it." Though he earlier signed measures to divest from Sudan and ban investing in Iran, the state's head politico avers that this bill would (a) cost CALPERS and CalSTRS billions of dollars in lost opportunities over the next 5 to 10 years (b) do little to discourage sovereign wealth fund investing overall and (c) be a fig leaf with respect to boosting human rights. Click to read "California can't afford a symbolic divestment that won't affect human rights."

On April 10, 2007, Sacremento Bee reporter Dale Kasler writes that Assemblyman Alberto Torrico (D-Newark) is withdrawing Assembly Bill 1967 "for the time being. (See "Lawmaker pulls bill to set human-rights limits on public pension fund investments.")

Of course, this does not eliminate an obvious question. Should the state (in an editorial sense, not a particular geographic locale) direct public plan investing?

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According to its February 18, 2008 press release, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is changing its asset allocation mix to 45 percent invested in fixed income, 45 percent invested in equity and 10 percent left for alternative investments. A spokesman explains that ratcheting up on private equity funds and real estate is expected to generate higher returns but reduce risk because of greater diversification, giving "the Corporation a 57 percent likelihood of full funding within ten years compared to 19 percent under the previous policy." In the past, the PBGC mix favored bonds with 75 to 85 percent being invested in fixed income securities, including some monies earmarked for liability-driven investing ("LDI") strategies. Some PBGC critics recently cited high opportunity costs by concentrating on notes and bonds.

With an accumulated deficit of $14 billion at the end of fiscal year 2007 and the recognition of the long-term nature of its obligations, the decision was arrived at, after "an extensive review process that began in mid-2007." Interestingly, an "Investment Program Fact Sheet" seems to contradict the newfound logic, stating that "Because of the statutory restrictions on investment of the Revolving Funds and a change in PBGC's investment policy adopted in 2004, fixed-income securities dominate PBGC's asset mix." Additional text emphasizes a relatively low tolerance for uncertainty. "The current investment policy continues PBGC's investment focus of limiting financial risk exposure by investing the majority of PBGC's assets in long duration fixed-income securities in order to reduce balance sheet volatility."

It would be interesting to know more about exactly why the PBGC decided to move into real estate and private capital pools now. How did they net the expected lower risk (due to diversification) against incremental risks association with interests that seldom trade? Access to meeting minutes would make for good reading. Though it is not an official U.S. government agency ("financed by premiums paid by employers, assets from failed pension plans, recoveries from bankruptcies and returns on invested assets"), many people believe that American taxpayers are ultimately on the hook in the event of a PBGC bailout. With a recession on the way and relatively low interest rates that push liabilities upward, bad news for this insurance agency is not out of the realm of possibility. Additionally, though premiums have increased, few economists believe that risky plans are paying their "fair share" and that "good" plans are subsidizing poor financial management elsewhere. If true, PBGC's exposure to default is that much higher.

The PBGC says it reviews its investment policy every two years. How often does it assess its outside managers? Will due diligence for alternative fund managers differ from the check-up imposed on traditional managers? How will the PBGC address valuation issues related to private equity, venture capital and real estate? What performance metrics can we expect PBGC to share with interested parties if "hard to value" assets are held at cost versus "fair market value?" Is there or will there be a Chief Risk Officer for PBGC who addresses asset-liability management on an enterprise risk basis? How will banks be impacted if private plans decide to follow PBGC's example and shy away from LDI? Will corporate plans follow suit?

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According to Global Pensions (January 10, 2008), Canadian, US and UK public pension fund investors are satisfied private equity investors. Surveying 108 institutions, Private Equity Intelligence Ltd (Preqin) found that "private equity out-performed for these pension plans in 82% of cases." In another survey, Preqin found that "95% of these investors predicted their private equity investments would out perform public market returns from a 2% advantge to over 4% in coming years."

Acknowledging the huge amount of money making its way into private equity, this blog's author wrote about the 4P's on December 31, 2007 - Pensions, Private Equity, Performance and Placement. We urged readers to study the risks, alongside the expected benefits, adding that valuation of private company economic interests can be challenging.

In response, Mr. Doug Miles, CEO of Globalprivatequity.com, Inc. wrote that life has surely changed when it comes to estimating value. We hope you find his commentary interesting. We welcome guest bloggers on any topic related to pension investing and risk management (which importantly includes the topic of valuation). Drop us a line if you want to share your thoughts with our fast-growing audience.

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                             Commentary by Doug Miles, CEO of Globalprivatequity.com, Inc.

For the first 15 years of my investment banking career, the typical rule of thumb for pricing private equity assets was to apply a 25 percent discount to a publicly traded comparable company or adjust the relevant industry multiple. New accounting rules such as FAS 157 make it difficult to take this easy way out.

An analyst is sometimes hard pressed to find data about public offerings that closely mirror the economic characteristics of a particular private equity investment. When that occurs, news announcements that convey buying interest can be helpful. Recent headlines about CALPERS' purchase of a 9.9 percent stake in technology buyout fund Silver Lake Partners illustrate. No longer sitting on the sidelines, CALPERS has a chance to recover 10 percent (or more) of its net cost in allocating to non-public companies by participating in deal-related income such as acquisition loans originated by Silver Lake.

Playing the role of private equity banker is not new. Ontario Teachers illustrates this "soup to nuts" with its furnishing of both debt and equity for Bell Canada. (See "Bell Canada Agrees to Purchase by Ontario Teachers - July 2, 2007.) General partners save on fees they pay. Moreover, they have flexibility to take a company public again or sell to a strategic buyer for many times the original commitment. Being an operator additionally empowers the "new paradigm" owner on the governance front. Did the Bell Canada deal improve the IRR for Ontario's plan participants? You bet.

Capital market players benefit too since such deals arguably enhance liquidity and promote valuation transparency. Given the brave new world of valuation compliance (FAS 157 and international equivalents), anything that gets us closer to marketability is a good thing. Anecdotally, we see an emerging consensus among our private investor clients to access better numbers. Applying arbitrary discounts is ill-advised. Being open to better process may explain why we've seen recent private company discounts narrow to 6.5 to 7 percent, relative to public comparables, for some sectors. In our own work (creating synthetic data prices for "hard to value" instruments such as whole loans), we employ an algorithm that estimates the private-public company differential by examining factors such as the rate of completed private company asset buyouts, how they are financed and the change in IPO values over the last twelve months.

Discounts vary over time. The current environment  (i.e. depressed high yield bond prices and fewer M&A transactions) could lead to the widening of lack of marketability discounts, particularly in those industries hard hit by credit problems. Monitoring performance by industry or sector, and for a variety of cycles and calendar time periods, is paramount. Global consolidation when steel or aluminum production sectors are hot (e.g. RUSAL) reduces the liquidity premium attached to public companies as increased deal flow sheds light on when and where buyers are willing to sign checks. Will this be true next year? Only time will tell. That is why it is so important to track the changing behavior of valuation adjustments.

With a need to enhance returns, alternatives like private equity will continue to attract retirement plan money. Look for more announcements as other pension funds follow the lead of CALPERS and Ontario Teachers. Hedge funds may even seek to organize groups of pension funds to execute large M&A deals, thereby adding to their treasure chest.

Editor's Note: As pension plans become even bigger players in global capital markets, it will be interesting to watch the inevitable fiduciary schizophrenia unfold. How will pension general partners deal with doing the right thing for limited partners when doing so conflicts with their duties to plan participants?

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Early editions of today's business papers describe an imminent sale of roughly 10 percent of technology private equity fund Silver Lake to pension giant, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System ("Calpers"). With a price tag of $275 million, Calpers will have a say in managing Silver Lake and also receive a pro-rata share of their earned investment fees. Private equity investors typically pay 2 percent of assets under management per annum plus 20 percent of gains in excess of an agreed upon benchmark. (See "California Pension Fund Expected to Take Big Stake in Silver Lake, at $275 Million" by Andrew Ross Sorkin, New York Times, January 9, 2007).  

A direct investment stake in Silver Lake creates new challenges, not the least of which is the subsequent negotiating power of Calpers with other private equity funds.

• Will this $260+ billion institutional investor now have greater sway with alternative fund managers, bargaining hard for fewer restrictions on transferability?
• If so, how will that impact the riskiness of its investment portfolio?
• Will Calpers ask Silver Lake to be more institution-friendly with respect to greater disclosure, lower fees, asset selection that reflects suitability, better risk controls and so on (assuming that Silver Lake is not already doing everything it can in these areas)?
• Will Calpers be exposed to fiduciary liability in the event of a Silver Lake buy-out gone bad?
• How will Calpers change its internal risk management policies and procedures as a result of this investment in Silver Lake? This includes the process by which "hard to value" holdings are marked to model or market.
• How will Calpers recognize the Silver Lake investment in terms of strategic asset allocation?

Notwithstanding these unanswered questions, this announcement is fascinating news to some, especially on the heels of a January 7, 2007 Financial Times article that quotes representatives of pension funds such as the Oregon Public Employees Retirement System and the California State Teachers' Retirement System as saying "never mind" to eroded returns. Acting defiantly, these institutional investors are in no mood to make private equity executives whole for higher taxes that may soon be mandated by Washington. (The current tax rate of 15 percent could rise to 35 percent.) (See "Pension funds in threat over private equity fees" by Francesco Guerrera and James Politi.)

Editor's Note: We talked about private equity on December 31,2007. Read "Pensions, Private Equity, Performance and Placement."

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As 2008 rolls in, uncertainty is on the minds of many. Will there be a recession? Will market volatility persist? Will asset prices continue to converge, making it more difficult to diversify? One question in particular is oft-discussed, notably the issue of strategic asset allocation for defined benefit plans. In a December 17, 2007 news release, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System Board of Administration announced its intent to invest nearly 70 percent of its $250 billion under management to stocks. Private equity will account for 10 percent, up from 6 percent. According to Charles P. Valdes, Investment Committee Chair, “These revised allocation markers reflect the promise of our private equity, real estate, and asset-linked investment classes."

In stark contrast, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation went in the opposite direction a few years ago, now bearing the burden of a positive equity risk premium. In a December 20, 2007 article entitled "The $4 billion trade-off: PBGC misses out by eschewing stocks in favor of LDI," Financial Week reporter Doug Halonen points out the perils of allocating a high percentage of assets to fixed income. He rightly points out "the irony" that numerous companies are seriously investigating the economics of adopting a liability-driven investing strategy which almost always entails a shift away from stocks to bonds and/or interest rate derivatives.

Importantly, the decision to invest in alternatives, including private equity, must reflect a careful analysis of the likely risk-return tradeoff, mapped to the objectives and constraints of a particular pension plan. A short-term focus could create upset for those exposed to holdings that more logically lend themselves to a long-term commitment. In today's "Wall St. Way: Smart People Seeking Dumb Money," New York Times reporter Eric Dash writes that investors in Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and Fidelity Investors "would have made more money this year investing in an old-fashioned index fund that tracks the S&P 500-stock index" rather than plunking down money for the IPO of "private equity powerhouse" Blackstone Group. Perhaps that's true but does it matter if their respective goals are to realize capital gain over the next five to seven years? (Note that this blog's author has no knowledge of the intent of either investor.)

Allowing for upside potential (and statistics do validate a big move into private equity by pensions, endowments and foundations), lack of liquidity and valuation difficulties are harsh realities. However, barriers are starting to soften. Barry Silbert, CEO of Restricted Stock Partners, operates the Restricted Securities Trading Network, a mechanism for trading insider stock options, convertible bonds and private investments in public equity. A recent venture capital injection is arguably a validation of this attempt to enhance fungibility of otherwise "infrequently traded" instruments. The PORTAL Alliance, brings together the Nasdaq Stock Market and leading securities firms to "create an open, industry-standard facility for the private offering, trading, shareholder tracking and settlement of unregistered equity securities sold to qualified institutional buyers ("QIBs")." If successful in allowing for ready buys and sells, institutions may be more open to kicking the private equity tires.

For further reading, these websites (a few of many) may be of interest:

• Private Equity Council
• Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group
• PrivateEquity.com.
  

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An October 9, 2007 Wall Street Journal article describes new academic research that suggests foul play in hedge fund orchards everywhere. In "Pricing Tactics Of Hedge Funds Under Spotlight: Some Managers Select Favorable Valuations To Lift Performance," reporters David Reilly and Gregory Zuckerman cite empirical evidence that hedge fund managers may cherry pick prices of "hard to value" instruments as a way to pretty up performance.

The issue of valuing instruments for which no ready market exists is a challenge indeed. At a time when pension funds are allocating billions of dollars to hedge funds, private equity and venture capital pools, fiduciaries risk serious fallout if they fail to establish solid ground rules regarding valuation. There are any number of "must have" elements that comprise effective policies and procedures. Ignore them and plan sponsors lose a precious opportunity to detect possible trouble before things get out of hand.

Now is not the time to take shortcuts when it comes to valuing "hard to value" instruments or conducting proper oversight of portfolio managers who trade relatively illiquid stocks, bonds, derivatives and hybrids.

If you are interested in reading other posts about valuation, click on any of the links provided below. In addition, feel free to email us if you want to read some of our many articles on the topics of risk management and valuation.

Valuation Problems Are Going to Cost Plan Sponsors Big Time

Model Risk - Great Unknown for Pension Plans

Valuation Awakening - Does the Emperor Have Clothes?

Tulip Craze Redux and What Models Mean to Pensions

Survey Shows that Pensions Worry About Risk Management and Valuation

Pensions and Hedge Funds and Private Equity - Assessing Risks

Hedge Fund Toolbox - Webinars for Pension Fiduciaries

Side Pockets and Valuation

Courts Want Evidence of Valuation Expertise

Private Equity, Mutual Funds and Valuation

Do You Really Know the Value of Your Portfolio?

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In reading "Alternative investments still hot with pension fund managers" (Andrew Osterland, Financial Week, September 27, 2007), several things caught this blogger's eye. Summarizing a recent Citigroup Investment Research Survey of U.S. and European funds, the article states that "almost 90% of pension fund managers allocate assets to private equity investments vs. 50% to hedge funds." It was somewhat surprising then to read that "over 80% of managers expressed concern over the lack of marking-to-market of hedge fund investments."

Does that mean that pension investors are less concerned about the valuation of private equity positions? That seems odd. While true that many hedge funds actively trade (and therefore tend to have a shorter holding period than private equity managers), we've fielded valuation calls from more than a few defined benefit plan auditors and investment committees. Concern about how to fair value any position for which no ready market exists - hedge fund or otherwise - ranks high on their "watch out" list.  

Though some believe that accounting rule changes are the primary reason for concern, the Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group reports the following:

FASB Statement No. 157 did not change GAAP, it includes "provisions which required subtle changes to the guidelines which could be deemed significant! Fair Value was required for PE investments prior to Statement 157. Statement No. 157 clarified the definition, usage and disclosures necessary when using Fair Value and in certain circumstances changes historic practice in the private equity industry as further outlined below." (Source: 2007 Updated Private Equity Valuation Guidelines Frequently Asked Questions)

With more than $1.0 trillion expected to flow into alternatives by 2010 (as per survey results), understanding hedge fund and private equity valuation is critical.

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According to a September 25, 2007 press release for the President's Working Group on Financial Markets ("PWG"), pension funds are playing an active role in setting policy. Following on the heels of guidelines released in February 2007, one committee, headed by Eric Mindich, CEO of Eton Park Capital Management, seeks to provide the asset management perspective. A second committee, led by Russell Read, Chief Investment Officer of the California Public Employees Retirement System, will represent institutional investors such as pensions, endowments and foundations. Click here to read yesterday's press release.

Drawing on the "Agreement Among PWG and U.S. Agency Principals on Principles and Guidelines Regarding Private Pools of Capital," drafted earlier this year, committee members will consider fiduciary duties. Not surprisingly, decision-makers are asked to consider the adequacy of disclosure, risk and valuation policies. Excerpted text follows.

• 5.1 Fiduciaries should consider the suitability of an investment in a private pool within the context of the overall portfolio and in light of the investment objectives and risk tolerances. Fiduciary evaluation should include the investment objectives, strategies, risks, fees, liquidity, performance history, and other relevant characteristics of a private pool.
• 5.2 Fiduciaries should evaluate the pool’s manager and personnel, including background, experience, and disciplinary history. Fiduciaries also should assess the pool’s service providers and evaluate their independence from the pool’s managers. Fiduciaries should consider the private pool’s manager’s conflicts-of-interest and whether the manager has appropriate controls in place to manage those conflicts.
• 5.3 Fiduciaries should conduct the appropriate due diligence regarding valuation methodology and performance calculation processes and business and operational risk management systems employed by a private pool, including the extent of independent audit evaluation of such processes and systems.
• 5.4 Fiduciaries that determine to invest in a private pool of capital should ensure that the size of their investment is consistent with their investment objectives and the principle of portfolio diversification.

The guidelines merit more than a cursory review. One sentence in particular struck a chord. Citing the importance of news, institutional investors are urged to obtain and analyze data that is both frequent and "with sufficient detail that creditors, counterparties, and investors stay informed of strategies, the amount of risk being taken by the pool, and any material changes." As readers of this blog know, seeing is believing. More than a few asset managers may be unwilling to unlock the keys to the information gateway, citing economic hardship if forced to provide full disclosure. Just a few days ago, the SEC announced penalties for an asset manager who failed to file Form 13F, evidencing their exercise of "investment discretion over $100 million or more." (Note: There is no universal agreement that 13F filings permit "sufficient" information transparency. At least one court case asks whether an asset manager should be forced to file without recompense for the "taking" of added-value that results from "superior" analysis.)

Additionally, access to greater amounts of information does not necessarily beget better information. Even if available data is Goldilocks perfect ("just right"), what happens when pension investors are unable to process what has been received?

It will be informative to see what the two committees create in terms of operationalizing these fine, but arguably broad, guidelines.

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Wall Street Journal reporter Craig Karmin reports that, post credit crunch, some public pension funds are having second thoughts about hedge fund and private equity investments. Cited as a "significant reversal in thinking," the article points out that pension funds have oft-cited alternatives as a way to diversify against shifts in market conditions. (See "Pension Managers Rethink Their Love of Hedge Funds," August 27, 2007.)

In an August 26 article entitled "Just How Contagious is That Hedge Fund," New York Times contributor and financial pundit, Mark Hulbert, debunks the notion that all hedge funds generate market-independent returns. He attributes asset class interconnections and similar strategies made by large hedge funds as culprits. A loss in one sector or fund is likely to appear elsewhere. Investing in "hard to value" positions is another challenge. (This blog's author, an accredited appraiser, is working with the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts to develop a hedge fund valuation course for October 2007.)

The Pension Governance team has been playing the role of Cassandra for many months. Click here for our January 4, 2007 post about contagion, the notion that what occurs in one market or fund cascades throughout the system. Regarding valuation, we've described the issue ad nauseum. Click on the Hedge Funds and Valuation folders on the left side of this blog's home page for lots of posts about these two topics.

For those who missed our six webinar series entitled Hedge Fund Toolbox^SM, we're nearly finished with the ebook equivalent. Email us if you want to be notified when it's ready.

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Summertime and the livin' may be easy for Porgy and Bess. If you're an investor caught in the middle of a scorching hot credit meltdown, things are far from tranquil. Besides the fact that many deals are being put on hold (thereby reducing the universe of available stocks and bonds), more than a few asset managers are reporting giant write-downs. If you haven't seen it, the Wall Street Journal's list of affected deals and organizations is sobering. Click here to read "Scorecard: Debt Dilemmas - How Credit-Market Tremors Have Affected Junk Bonds, LBOs and Hedge Funds."

Jittery traders are starting to wonder how quickly sub-prime loan problems will spread to other market sectors, ultimately impacting the ability of corporations and individuals to borrow and spend. In "Strategies correlate after credit market crunch hits," Financial Times reporters Peter Garnham and Paul J. Davies describe changing patterns across markets and strategies. What does this mean for institutional investors? Quite simply, a lot.

Hedge funds and private equity managers who tout absolute return (based on uncorrelated return patterns) are going to have a tough challenge ahead if convergence occurs. Defined benefit plan sponsors are going to have no less a difficult time.

Strategic asset allocations are going to be directly (and arguably materially) impacted by the notion that "the investment world is getting smaller." To read an earlier post about contagion, click here to access "Pension Contagion - Should We Worry?"

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According to the Daily Texan, the University of Texas Investment Management Company will soon have to rely on its internal audit staff. Chairman of the University System's Audit, Compliance and Management Review Committee, Regent Robert Estrada "reported to the board that Ernst & Young was uncomfortable with pricing the investment company's private equity and hedge fund investments. Regent Robert Rowling added that the firm also had issues with the time gap between UTIMCO's quarterly reports." Click here to read the article.

In a related piece, this blogger was interviewed about the topic of hedge fund valuation in Securities Industry News. Part of a June 4, 2007 special report entitled "Critical Issues for Hedge Funds," the topic of how, why and when hedge funds get valuation help (or don't as the case may be) arose. As an accredited appraiser, I know from firsthand experience that many people in hedge fund land do not acknowledge the presence of the traditional business valuation community. That's not necessarily good since the latter group has long ago acknowledged the regulatory prohibition against a formulaic approach and the need for specialized valuation training. Judges are none too happy and are tossing expert opinions out of their courtroom if they fail to reflect established valuation concepts and practices.

When asked why valuation is so important in this industry, I said the following:

<<  Valuation numbers drive nearly every financial decision. Hedge fund managers need to know how to rebalance their portfolios, adjust risk management positions and report numbers to investors upon which they earn their fees. Valuation becomes especially important in the case of illiquid investments like private equity, distressed securities, emerging-market securities and complex derivatives. It is also an issue as more hedge funds go public. How else will you come up with a net asset value for the initial public offering, without a formal assessment? Additionally, institutional investors are on the hook to understand how hedge funds value their holdings. The last thing pension fund, foundation or endowment fiduciaries want is a blowup that could have been prevented with a thorough vetting of the managers' valuation process. That includes assurance from the hedge fund managers that numbers are being provided by an independent third party. >> (To read "The State of Valuation", go to www.securitiesindustrynews.com. A subscription is required but you can register for a trial.)

If you would like a copy of some of the articles I've written about hedge fund, derivative instrument and asset valuation, click here to send an email.

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In his May 16 testimony to Congress, Mr. Douglas Lowenstein, head of the Private Equity Council, extolled the virtues of non-public investments. With over $110 billion invested in private equity by twenty large public pension funds, Lowenstein cites relatively higher historical returns that have helped plan sponsors pay the bills. Click here to read his testimony.

A few months earlier, a survey conducted by the State Street Bank describes escalating interest in hedge funds. At the same time, half of respondents expressed "a need for additional reporting and analysis on the part of hedge fund managers and more rigorous due diligence practices," adding that "they find it difficult to gain a portfolio-wide view of risk, and that aggregating risk statistics provided by all hedge funds in their portfolio was problematic. The same number also agreed that obtaining an accurate valuation of hedge fund holdings can be problematic." Click here to read the executive summary of the survey.

As with any investment, there is no "perfect" choice. Selection depends on a wide variety of factors.( A discussion about optimal asset allocation and security/fund selection is outside the scope of this blog post.) However, a few points are in order.

1. Risk management and valuation concerns are not created equal. They vary across type of asset and fund. Private equity funds tend to trade less frequently than hedge funds. Even within an asset class (assuming you agree that hedge funds constitute a separate asset class), the risk-return tradeoff varies by strategy, management and much more. For example, the use of derivatives by a market neutral hedge fund can differ dramatically from that of a macro oriented fund.

2. The use of a side pocket may reduce the need for frequent valuations. However, institutional investors need to understand if a side pocket is to be used, what will go inside the side pocket and the impact on reported performance as a result of its use.

3. Knowing that a manager employs derivatives is not enough. Understanding instrument and strategy choice is likewise important (though still not sufficient).

4. Valuation numbers provided by traders or anyone else who stands to benefit by reporting high numbers should be discarded and replaced with those provided by an independent party.

If you are interested in knowing about other red flags, email us in confidence.

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In case you missed it, here is the link to a video of my appearance on CNBC's Morning Call.  While I concede that it's impossible to have an in-depth conversation in only a few minutes, several things are worth mentioning as a result of the May 17 chat with host Mr. Mark Haines.

1. Not all institutional investors have a large staff to vet different investment ideas. Moreover, large does not always mean better. Witness Fannie Mae and Amaranth Advisors. "Thorough" is the watch word.

2. If considering a hedge fund, ask if the fund has a functional risk manager who monitors, tests and reviews policies for financial and operational trouble spots. Does that person have independence and authority to effect meaningful change?

3. I believe the other speaker in this segment said that private equity avoids having to deal with the daily volatility of being invested in public equities. Caution - The absence of a ready trading market does not necessarily mean that there is less risk. Some could easily assert the opposite. Private equity deals, because they are private, entail valuation challenges, difficulty in liquidating ownership interests and so on.

4. The use of correlation (a measure of linear association) to gauge diversification benefits depends on having good data for all relevant time periods. If using an inappropriately long calendar period (example: last ten years), output may reflect a smoothing out effect which therefore underestimates "true" volatility.

5. There is much more to say on the topics of risk management and valuation!

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In "U.S. Department of Justice Comes Knocking, Raising Specter of Private Equity Antitrust Concerns," law firm Goodwin Procter, LLP writes that "the DOJ has sent out requests to some of the industry's largest and most well-known firms, asking that these firms provide information and documents relating to company auctions since 2003."

Reported earlier by the Wall Street Journal ("Private-Equity Firms Face Anticompetitive Probe" by Dennis K. Berman and Henny Sender - October 10, 2006) and Red Herring.com, the DOJ is interested in knowing how firms transact and the extent to which competition in bidding occurs.

At the same time, Investment Dealers' Digest reports on the imminent launch of a new trade association, the Private Equity Council ("PE Trade Group Nearing Launch Amid Intensifying Scrutiny" by Ken MacFadyen - October 30, 2006). Slated as its new head, Mr. Harry Clark "insists that the group's genesis was in no way a response to the Justice Department's inquiry and he notes its role will not be in reacting to such events."

At a time when pension funds are increasingly looking at alternative investments such as hedge funds and private equity opportunities, an issue that resurfaces time and time again is transparency. In August 2005, the State of Illinois enacted legislation to protect "the commercially sensitive information of companies that receive private equity funding from public pension funds." One of five other states at the time, the then-cited goal was to "provide transparency in public investments in private equity without damaging portfolio companies' ability to compete."

You may recall an earlier post about hedge fund competitiveness and transparency. (Click here to read "Pensions, Hedge Funds and Disclosure" about Mr. Phillip Goldstein's letter to the U.S. SEC in which he requests exemption from the filing of Form 13F. In that post, I talked about the relationship between information and fiduciary responsibility.

No doubt the issues of transparency and market structure will continue to grab headlines. It's far from trivial.

Editor's Note:
Mr. Goldstein sent a copy of the letter to share with readers. Click below.
(GoldsteinLetter.pdf)

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Wall Street Journal reporter, Eleanor Laise recently wrote that an increasing number of mutual funds are "venturing into the risky world of private-equity investments", "because of the prospects for higher returns." While SEC rules limit assets to no more than fifteen percent in illiquid holdings, Ms. Laise describes potential problems. Higher legal expenses for more complex deals, difficulty of unwinding a position and valuing private investments are far from trivial challenges. She cites one SEC investigation of a mutual fund that allegedly undervalued its private company positions to give the impression that it had not breached the fifteen percent limit. "The SEC also has charged funds with inflating the value of illiquid investments. Mutual-fund managers have an incentive to overestimate the value of these holdings because they collect fees that are calculated as a percentage of total assets in the fund." (See "Mutual Funds Delve Into Private Equity" by Eleanor Laise, Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2006.)

Applying a version of the transitive property from mathematics, the implication is clear. Some pension funds have increasing exposure to private equity investments that do not trade in a ready market.

1. Pension funds allocate money to mutual funds.

2. Mutual funds buy private equity.

3. Pension funds are exposed to private equity as an asset class. (This is in addition to any direct allocation by pension funds to private equity.)

The message is clear. For those pension funds investing more money in private equity (indirectly or directly), the valuation issues are real and cannot be overlooked.

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